

I have written that "religion as such is neither a metaphysics nor a morality. On the contrary, its own formulations of the beliefs it necessarily implies (i.e., its *credenda*) are always for the sake of one's so understanding oneself as also to perform certain actions instead of others, just as its own specifications of the actions it necessarily implies (i.e., its *agenda*) are, again, always for the sake of one's so understanding oneself as also to believe certain beliefs instead of others" (Notebooks: 29 April 1995; rev. 21 September 2002).

Unless I'm mistaken, however, this is very close indeed to what Wittgenstein is getting at when he says, "Christianity is not grounded in a historical truth, but rather gives us a (historical) report and says: now believe! But not, believe this report with the faith proper to a historical report,—but rather: believe through thick and thin, and this you can do only as the result of a life. *Here you have a report,—but don't relate to it as you would to any other historical report!* Let it have an utterly different place in your life.— There is nothing paradoxical in this!"

Of course, it's also close to what Bultmann says about the relation of faith and world view (cf. Notebooks: 24 September 2005).

26 November 2005