

I have written that “religious or theological statements are existential statements [*sc.* to the first power, in the proper sense], although the foundational assertions among them neither are nor could be factual assertions” (“Linguistic Analysis and Theology”: 325). But this will hardly do—for two reasons:

(1) because no religious or theological statements simply *are* existential statements (whether to the first power, in the proper sense, only, or also to the second power, in the emphatic sense with respect to what they are about), but rather (being existential in the third sense, also to the second power, in the emphatic sense with respect to how they are about what they are about) necessarily *imply* existential statements (to the first power only—in the case of the statements their existential-*historical* statements imply—or also to the second power—in the case of the statements their existential-*transcendental* statements imply); and

(2) because “the foundational assertions” among religious or theological statements (including as they do existential-*historical* as well as existential-*transcendental* assertions) necessarily imply *factual* statements (in the case of foundational existential-*historical* assertions) as well as *metaphysical* statements (in the case of foundational existential-*transcendental* assertions).

In sum: (1) religious or theological statements are not themselves existential statements, although they necessarily imply such; and (2) foundational religious or theological assertions necessarily imply factual ~~and~~ as well as metaphysical statements.

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