

1. Whether or not  $Y$ 's believing  $p$  simply because  $X$  enunciates  $p$  is reasonable depends on whether or not  $X$ 's *de facto* epistemic authority for  $Y$  is also legitimate or valid, i.e., *de jure*, authority. And this depends, in turn, on  $X$ 's *de facto* epistemic authority also being a grounded epistemic authority.

2.  $X$ 's *de facto* epistemic authority for  $Y$  is a grounded epistemic authority if, and only if, it is possible for someone—if not  $Y$ , then others—to test  $X$ 's claims to knowledge in realm  $R$ . This means (1) that knowledge of what  $X$  claims to know can be attained otherwise than by relying on some epistemic authority; and (2) that there is an independent criterion by which all claims to knowledge in  $R$  can be tested.

July 1996