

One is the bearer of authority *de jure* over certain subjects in a certain domain by reason *either* of one's knowledge or competence in that domain—in the case of “epistemic,” or, more generally, “nonexecutive,” authority—or of one's holding, and being competent to hold, some office or position with respect to the domain—in the case of “deontic,” “moral,” or “executive” authority.

Thus to know something—either to know *that* or *about* something or to know *how* something—is *eo ipso* to bear authority *de jure* (whether or not also *de facto*) by reason of one's knowledge. Similarly, to hold a certain office or position, and to have the competence to exercise its rights and responsibilities, is *eo ipso* to bear authority *de jure* (whether or not also *de facto*) by reason of one's office or position.

If having deontic authority means that one has the right and the responsibility to give instructions (so Bochenski: 45), may one not say, *mutatis mutandis*, that having epistemic authority means that one has the right and the responsibility to assert propositions, practical as well as theoretical?

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