

1. The twofold assertion (or the two assertions) constitutive of Christian witness explicitly as such is (or are):

*Jesus is (formally) the decisive re-presentation of the meaning of ultimate reality for us; and*

*God is (formally) strictly ultimate reality in its meaning for us.*

2. In the case of both parts of this constitutive assertion (or both of these constitutive assertions), their existential significance comes out only when they are converted, so as to read respectively:

*The decisive re-presentation of the meaning of ultimate reality for us is (materially) Jesus; and*

*Strictly ultimate reality in its meaning for us is (materially) God.*

3. Each part of the constitutive assertion (or each of the constitutive assertions) involves a necessary presupposition, as follows:

*Jesus is a fully real human being; and*

*God is as conceived by radical monotheism, i.e., "the one which is all," the one all-inclusive whole of reality from which and through which and for which are all things (cf. Rom 11:36; 1 Cor 8:6).*

4. Because of the first of these necessary presuppositions, a priori christology, properly understood, is more than simply thought and speech about the decisive re-presentation of the meaning of ultimate reality for us, or, as may also be said, the explicit, primal, ontic source authorizing a particular faith/witness of faith/religion. Although a priori christology is indeed thought and speech about such a decisive re-presentation or source of authorization, the converse statement is false: thought and speech about such a re-presentation or source may or may not be a priori christology. It is a priori christology, properly so-called, if, and only if, it presupposes that the decisive re-presentation or source of authorization—whatever else it is—is a fully real human being, and not someone or something else.

5. This is why the formula for any type of a priori christology properly reads:

*x, for any possible value of x, can be truly asserted to be of decisive significance for human existence if, and only if, x is not only a fully real human being, but also . . . [whatever else, according to the type of a priori christology in question, is necessary to x's being the decisive re-presentation of the meaning of ultimate reality for us, or, alternatively, the explicit, primal, ontic source authorizing a particular faith/witness of faith/religion].*

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