

I assume that there is a close correspondence between Tillich's talk of "absolute faith," etc., on the one hand, and W. A. Christian's talk of the "basic supposition," etc. of religious inquiry. Just as, for Tillich, there is no going behind "absolute faith," so, for Christian, there is no going any deeper than the "basic supposition."

My question is, What, in principle, is the object of "absolute faith" if not the object of transcendental metaphysics in the broad sense, i.e., ultimate reality, in the sense of the necessary, absolutely, and also the necessary, relatively to human existence as such? But considered more existentially, this same object is the ground in reality itself of basic confidence in the ultimate meaning of life.

Also, isn't Tillich's talk about "absolute faith" his way of talking about the necessary condition of the possibility of the *optio fundamentalis*?

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