

1. The twofold assertion (or the two assertions) constitutive of Christian witness explicitly as such is (or are):

*Jesus is (formally) the decisive re-presentation of the meaning of ultimate reality for us; and*

*God is (formally) strictly ultimate reality in its meaning for us.*

2. In the case of both parts of this constitutive assertion (or both of these constitutive assertions), their existential significance comes out only when they are converted, so as to read respectively:

*The decisive re-presentation of the meaning of ultimate reality for us is (materially) Jesus; and*

*Strictly ultimate reality in its meaning for us is (materially) God.*

3. Each part of the constitutive assertion (or each of the constitutive assertions) involves a necessary presupposition, as follows:

*Jesus is a fully real human being; and*

*God is as conceived by radical monotheism, i.e., "the one which is all," the one all-inclusive whole of reality from which and through which and for which are all things (cf. Rom 11:36; 1 Cor 8:6).*

4. Because of the first of these necessary presuppositions, a priori christology, properly understood, is more than simply thought and speech about the decisive re-presentation of the meaning of ultimate reality for us, or, as may also be said, the explicit, primal, ontic source authorizing a particular faith/witness of faith/religion. Although a priori christology is indeed thought and speech about such a decisive re-presentation or source of authorization, the converse statement is false: thought and speech about such a re-presentation or source may or may not be a priori christology. It is a priori christology, properly so-called, if, and only if, it presupposes that the decisive re-presentation or source of authorization—whatever else it is—is a fully real human being, and not someone or something else.

5. This is why the formula for any type of a priori christology properly reads:

*x, for any possible value of x, can be truly asserted to be of decisive significance for human existence if, and only if, x is not only a fully real human being, but also . . . [whatever else, according to the type of a priori christology in question, is necessary to x's being the decisive re-presentation of the meaning of ultimate reality for us, or, alternatively, the explicit, primal, ontic source authorizing a particular faith/witness of faith/religion].*

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What is the concept that an apriori christology explicates—namely, by specifying the necessary conditions of the possibility of truly asserting it (or any other functionally equivalent and interchangeable predicate such as "the Christ") of any subject?

In my essay, "A Priori Christology and Experience" (as well as elsewhere), I take the concept in question to be "being of decisive (existential) significance for human existence." Thus I formulate the formula for any a priori christology as follows: "for any possible value of  $x$ ,  $x$  can be truly asserted to be of decisive significance for human existence if, and only if, . . . ." It is also clear from the context of formulations like this that the reason I take to explain any  $x$ 's being of such decisive significance is that it is the decisive answer to the existential question.

In other places, however, I take the concept in question to be "being the explicit primal (ontic) source of authority authorizing authentic human existence." Not surprisingly, then, there are still other places where I can say that it is both concepts—that all ways of understanding Jesus christologically, whether mythological or legendary, "must be understood as indirect experience of Jesus as decisive for human existence—as the explicit primal [ontic] source of Christian existence and of an authentic human existence."

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