

As necessary as it is that faith find expression through assertions as well as actions, both—assertions of faith and actions of faith—are always problematic.

This is true of assertions of faith both

(1) because any assertion of faith may always be misunderstood, not as an existential (or existential-historical) assertion, but as an empirical (or empirical-historical) assertion (Indeed, in the case of assertions of faith formulated mythologically, such misunderstanding is practically unavoidable.); and

(2) because any assertion of faith may always conduce to faith itself being misunderstood as a matter of believing certain assertions, rather than as a matter of understanding oneself in one's ultimate setting as part of the encompassing whole.

But actions of faith are similarly problematic both

(1) because any action of faith may always be misunderstood, not as a necessary consequence of faith, but as a necessary condition of the grace of which faith is the sole condition; and

(2) because any action of faith may always conduce to faith itself being misunderstood as a matter of performing certain actions, rather than as a matter of self-understanding.

28 May 1997; rev. 3 March 1999

As necessary as it is that faith find expression through assertions as well as actions, any assertion of faith is always problematic—both

(1) because it may itself be misunderstood, not as an existential (or existential-historical) assertion, but as an empirical (or empirical-historical) assertion (Indeed, in the case of assertions of faith formulated mythologically, such misunderstanding is practically unavoidable.); and

(2) because it may conduce to faith's also being misunderstood as a matter of believing and/or making assertions, rather than as a matter of understanding one's own existence in its ultimate setting as part of the encompassing whole.

28 May 1997