

On Loving and Being Loved

1. If what it means to be loved by another is to experience the effect of the other as optimizing the limits of one's own freedom (cf. *Faith and Freedom*, 2d ed.: 54 f.), isn't this to settle for a definition of love as beneficence, rather than sympathy?

2. It is, indeed. But, then, what's wrong with that? Isn't any "act of love," properly so-called, something distinct from the sympathy out of which it arises precisely because or insofar as it is beneficent toward the one(s) to whom it is directed? Perhaps one must say that, without sympathy, beneficence is not love—so far as ^{the} benefactor is concerned. But must one say the same of the beneficiary?

3. In one case, it would seem, one must indeed say the same—namely, where the benefit in question is such that only sympathy could provide it. Thus, for example, if the benefit in question is not *something* that makes a difference to one, but rather *someone* to whom one makes a difference, then, apparently, there could be no love without sympathy. But, significantly, there also could be no beneficence.

4. Where I seem to be going with this is to hold that there's beneficence, and there's beneficence—that which does, and that which does not, require sympathy.

5. In any case, *consummative and redemptive* love is and must be sympathy, even if *creative and emancipative* love need be no more than beneficence.

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