

The particular necessarily implies the universal. But the universal does not necessarily imply the particular. The universal may indeed be said to *anticipate* the particular necessarily, in that it necessarily implies at least *some* particular(s) or other. But it may not be said to imply the particular necessarily in the way in which the particular necessarily implies it, i.e., *presupposes* it.

This is to state the general rule or principle that explains why talk of "implicit Christianity," in the second sense of the phrase, as I have distinguished it (cf. Notebooks, 13 December 2002; rev. 9 December 2008; also, 11 December 2004), may well need to be avoided. Such talk is problematic because it appears to violate this rule or principle—namely, by tacitly claiming that, if being a Christian necessarily implies having a certain self-understanding/ understanding of existence, having this same self-understanding/ understanding of existence necessarily implies being (at least implicitly) a Christian. According to the above stated rule or principle, being a Christian is precisely *not* implied in having a certain self-understanding/ understanding of existence, unless by "implied" is meant "anticipated," rather than "presupposed."

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