

Granted that the relatively more concrete or particular necessarily *presupposes* the relatively more abstract or universal, rather than the other way around, couldn't one nevertheless say with equal justification that the relatively more abstract or universal necessarily *anticipates* the relatively more concrete or particular? (By "presuppose" here is meant "implies by a necessity that is definite and specific," whereas by "anticipate," on the contrary, is meant "implies by a necessity that is indefinite and generic.")

Thus one could say, for example, that, whereas Christian faith necessarily presupposes theistic faith, even as theistic faith, in turn, necessarily presupposes elemental faith, elemental faith only necessarily anticipates theistic faith, even as theistic faith, in turn, only necessarily anticipates Christian faith.

This means, among other things, that there can be proof, in the strict sense of logical deduction, not from the relatively more abstract or universal to the relatively more concrete or particular, but only in the reverse direction—from the relatively more concrete or particular to the relatively more abstract or universal.

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