

In my Notebooks, 15 June 2000, I say that:

" . . . there is really only one such religious or [philosophical] argument [sc. for a particular religion or world view]—*to the effect that we exist humanly at all only because we at least implicitly believe in this particular religion or world view and that, as a consequence, we must also believe it explicitly if our explicit [understanding of existence] is to be both complete and consistent.* Otherwise put: the only really essential 'proof' of any particular religion or world view is *to show that any and all of us are selves at all only because we at least implicitly believe in it and that, as a consequence, our faith must also become explicit lest the inventory of our explicit beliefs be either incomplete or inconsistent*" (italics added).

To take account of my subsequent reflections on what should and should not be said about a religion's being believed "implicitly," the two italicized passages should be rewritten respectively as follows:

" . . . to the effect that what we all believe at least implicitly if we exist humanly at all is explicitly re-presented in this particular religion or world view and that, as a consequence, we, too, may explicitly believe as it gives and commands us to do, thereby rendering our explicit understanding of existence both complete and consistent."

" . . . to show that any and all of us are selves at all only because we at least implicitly believe what a particular religion or world view somehow makes explicit and that, in consequence, our faith need not remain merely implicit, so as to leave the inventory of our explicit beliefs incomplete even if not inconsistent."

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A particular religion or world view's claim to truth may be said to be religiously or existentially valid because or insofar as it responds to the existential question in such a way as to answer it, thereby solving the problem that any religion or world view exists to solve, i.e., of somehow making sense of our basic faith in the meaning of life, given the facts of life as we actually experience it.

To establish that a particular religion or world view does this is the objective of all arguments for its truth insofar as they belong to properly religious or existential inquiry. Thus, however many may be the ways of developing it, there is really only one such religious or existential argument—to the effect that we exist humanly at all only because we at least implicitly believe in this particular religion or world view and that, as a consequence, we must also believe in it explicitly if our explicit self-understanding is to be both complete and consistent. Otherwise put: the only really essential "proof" of any particular religion or world view is to show that any and all of us are selves at all only because we at least implicitly believe in it and that, in consequence, our faith must also become explicit lest the inventory of our explicit beliefs be either incomplete or inconsistent.

But this religious or existential way of arguing for the truth of a particular religion or world view is not the only way of giving reasons for it. Because the properly existential question is closely related logically to both the properly metaphysical and the properly moral questions, there can and must also be both metaphysical and moral arguments for any religion or world view. To be exact, there can and must be as many metaphysical arguments for it as there are metaphysical concepts, by which I mean, transcendental concepts having completely unrestricted or universal application, including the transcendental concept of God, or of strictly ultimate reality itself or as such. On the other hand, moral arguments are really only different ways of formulating a single argument, to the effect that moral action would be neither possible nor make any sense but for the fact that ultimate reality has one structure rather than some other.

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