

The record shows, I fear, that I have not consistently said the same thing, but rather several different things, about the logical relation between existential assertions, on the one hand, and metaphysical and moral assertions, on the other. If X means existential assertions, Y , metaphysical and moral assertions, and \rightarrow implies, I have said, at different times and in different places, the following:

$X \rightarrow Y$

$X \rightarrow Y$, and Y , to a certain extent, $\rightarrow X$

$X \rightarrow Y$, and $Y \rightarrow$ something about X

$X \rightarrow Y$, and $Y \rightarrow$ at least the possibility of X

The one thing I don't think I've said (at least I haven't found any place where I have) is:

$X \rightarrow Y$, and $Y \rightarrow X$

25 December 2002