

It occurs to me that my distinction between "the Jesus of history as a fact of the past," on the one hand, and the further distinction between "the empirical-historical Jesus" and "the existential-historical Jesus," on the other, is yet another application of the old scholastic distinction between material and formal object.

Thus one properly says, in terms of this distinction, that what I call "the Jesus of history as a fact of the past" (= "the actual Jesus of the past," or "the actual Jesus of history") is the material object both of Christian faith and witness and of "the quest of the historical Jesus," or better, "the historical quest for Jesus" (Marxsen). But, then, this same material object appears under a significantly different horizon, depending on which of the two ways of relating to this object is in question. In the case of the historical quest for Jesus, it appears under the horizon opened up by asking the *empirical*-historical question; and so the formal, as distinct from the material, object, assuming this question, is rightly distinguished as "the *empirical*-historical Jesus." In the other case of Christian faith and witness, this same material object appears ~~u~~nder the different horizon opened up by asking the *existential*-historical question; and so its formal object, assuming this very different question, is rightly distinguished as "the *existential*-historical Jesus."

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