

According to Bultmann, "[t]he one reality [sc. of history, or of the history of the past] . . . can be seen under a double aspect in accordance with our double possibility as human beings of existing authentically or inauthentically. In inauthentic existence we understand ourselves in terms of the world that stands at our disposal, whereas in authentic existence we understand ourselves in terms of the future of which we cannot dispose. Correspondingly, we can look at the history of the past in an objectifying way or else as personal address, insofar as in it the possibilities of human self-understanding become perceptible and summon us to responsible choice" (*NTM*: 158).

This, clearly, is the very distinction of which my distinction between the empirical-historical Jesus and the existential-historical Jesus is a special case. Thus there is but one reality of Jesus as an instance of what Bultmann calls "history," or "the history of the past." But this one reality of Jesus can be seen under a double aspect—and for the very same reason that any and all other instances of history can be so seen. Looked at in one way, in "an objectifying way," this one reality is what I mean by "the empirical-historical Jesus," while looked at in the other way "as personal address," etc., this same reality is what I mean by "the existential-historical Jesus," i.e., Jesus "insofar as in [him] the possibilities of human self-understanding become perceptible and summon us to responsible choice."

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