

Could it be that Bultmann's reason for saying that existentialist analysis (as well as existentialist interpretation) is "*indirect* address" is analogous to, if not the same as, Bochenski's reason for distinguishing "practical propositions" from "instructions"?

Yes, I think it could be said to be analogous because Bochenski's distinction is not simply different from Bultmann's, even if it is also not simply the same. One difference, it seems, is that address, according to Bultmann, may be "indirect" not only because it explicates a self-understanding to be actualized (*faciendum*), but also because it speaks of the fact already actualized (*factum*) whose meaning for us implies, even as it is implied by, the self-understanding. But in that event, Bultmann's "indirect address" would appear to be comprised of something more like Bochenski's "theoretical propositions" than his "practical propositions."

My guess is that Bochenski's distinctions between "propositions" and "instructions," and then, between "theoretical" and "practical propositions" apply most appropriately and usefully to the categorial level of life-praxis, whereas Bultmann's distinction is more apt for thinking and talking about the transcendental level of self-understanding, prior to the split between practical and theoretical, meaning for us and structure in itself.

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