

Speaking of the understanding of existence that is expressed in the mythology of the New Testament, Bultmann says: "In question is the truth of this understanding, and faith affirms its truth, even though it may not be bound to the New Testament's world of representations" ("NTM": 23 [NTM: 10]).

What does it mean, exactly, to say that faith *affirms* the truth of an understanding of existence? That faith *implies* the truth of such an understanding seems clear enough. But if faith is not to be confused with affirming to be true (*Fürwahrhalten*), there may be reason enough not to say what Bultmann says.

In any case, Bultmann is evidently no more willing to give up talking about faith's making (or implying) truth claims than he is to give up talking about its talking about reality. The issue for him is not *whether* faith's statements are cognitively significant, but only *how*, or in what sense.

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