

When Bultmann says—in his discussion with Karl Jaspers—that Jaspers cannot get around so explicating what he calls "clarification of existence" (*Existenzerhellung*) that it becomes generally understandable, which is to say, "he must objectify it to doctrine" (90), he is evidently applying to the case of the philosopher of existence the very principles he later applies to the theologian. I refer to what he says about the paradox of theology—namely, that, "like all science, it must speak of faith objectifyingly, in the knowledge that all its speaking makes its point only in sublating the objectification" (96).

That this is so is clear, I think, from what Bultmann goes on to say about Jaspers: "And if Jaspers could say that the objectification must be sublating in genuine (existential) understanding, a corresponding statement could be made about Heidegger's existentialist analysis. His analysis of human existence as an existence closed in itself and resolved for itself in being-toward-death does not take the risk of existing away from the person whom it convinces as 'doctrine.' On the contrary, it shows that existence can be taken over only by me myself and makes clear the responsibility demanded by Jaspers," etc. (90).

5 December 2001