

To say, as Bultmann does, that "the 'right' philosophy," in the sense of "a philosophical analysis of existence," "does not ask the question about the meaning of existence as an existential question, but rather inquires by way of existentialist analysis what existence means in general" (*NTM*: 107), is to say that "the 'right' philosophy" does exactly what any world view also does, i.e., clarify what existence means in general.

But, then, existentialist philosophy and humanist-idealist philosophy are materially different ways of doing formally the same thing—or, if you will, materially different answers to formally the same question. They are both addressed, albeit indirectly, to the same existential question; but their answers are different, in that the first takes account, as the second does not, of the historicity of human existence, thereby satisfying the criterion of a "legitimate" world view that the second fails to satisfy.

When Bultmann says that philosophy does not "prescribe to us: *so* should you exist," but "says to us only: you should *exist*," I can only wonder whether he may not be making the same point I should make by saying that it is not the business of philosophy as such to tell persons what religion they should accept, but only to make clear: (1) what, in general, it means to be religious; and (2) what understanding of existence a religion must somehow express if its claim to be the true religion is to be a valid claim.

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