

If human existence is "uncanny," "enigmatic," etc., because it is uniquely temporal and historical existence, then it makes no sense to say, as Bultmann seems to say, that the uncanniness of existence has its basis in sin. It is indeed true that there are aspects of the uncanniness of my existence as I in fact experience it that would no doubt be otherwise, were it not for sin—my own sin as well as that of all my fellow human beings. But it is just as true that, even if one were to prescind from sin altogether, human existence would still be uncanny, enigmatic, etc., insofar as it was fragmentary existence capable of self-understanding and, therefore, burdened with responsibility for understanding itself authentically and leading its life accordingly.

Of course, it is essential that sin be understood as a transcendental, not as a merely categorial (specifically, moral), concept. In *this* sense, or for this reason, one can and should say with Bultmann that the uncanniness of existence as we all in fact experience it has its basis in sin. But there would be uncanniness with or without sin; and sin is not the basis of uncanniness but the inauthentic way of coping with it, which, relative to particular categorial acts and ways of acting, is transcendental.

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