

To think of anything at all is to think of God. For to think of anything that is not God or necessarily implied by God is to think of it as either potential or actual, and thus as something that God alone has made possible—^{both}~~either~~ in principle (= the primordial nature of God) ^{and}~~or~~ in fact (= the consequent nature of God) (MVG: 305 f.).

Concrescence as the process of becoming concrete is bound to occur, for it is the referent directly or indirectly of any significant expression, and is presupposed by any and every kind of reality or truth. But just *what* concrescence takes place is not thus necessary but contingent. Even divine concrescence is contingent, except in the sense in which concrescence as such necessarily implies a divine as well as a nondivine level of concrescence. Concrescence as such, in other words, is a two-level process that is always and necessarily both divine and nondivine, although just *what* becomes concrete is always and necessarily contingent (cf. “The Philosophy of Creative Synthesis”: 951).

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To think of anything at all is to think of God. For to think of anything that is not God is to think of it as either actual or potential, and thus to think of it as something either that God *has done* (= the consequent nature of God) or that God *can do* (= the primordial nature of God) (cf. *MVG*: 305 f.).

Concrescence is bound to occur; it cannot not occur, for it is the referent of any and every significant expression, and is presupposed by any and every kind of truth or reality. But what particular concrescences take place is always contingent. Even divine concrescence is contingent, save in the sense in which concrescence as such implies a divine as well as a nondivine level of concrescence. Concrescence is essentially a two-level affair: it is always and necessarily both divine and nondivine (cf. "The Philosophy of Creative Synthesis": 951).