

That creativity is given and definitely *imaginable* only as psychical, I readily grant. But I dispute Hartshorne's claim that it "is given and definitely *conceivable* only as psychical" (*IO*: 36; italics added).

Creativity can perfectly well be definitely conceived as "concrecence," the process of "growing together" whereby alone there are "concretes" (= things "grown together"), be they singulars (i.e., events or individuals) or aggregates. By this process, in Whitehead's words, "[t]he many become one, and are increased by one" (*PRC*: 21). "Also," Whitehead says, "there are two senses of the one—namely, the sense of the one which is all, and the sense of the one among the many" (*MT*: 150).

Allowing that "concrecence" and "concretes" imply "concreteness," which in turn implies "abstractness," as the transcendental property common to all "abstracts," ordinary and extraordinary (= transcendental), one has all the fundamental concepts of metaphysics in the strict sense of the word. Reality as such is creativity = concrecence, and therefore comprises concretes and abstracts (including the transcendental abstracts "concrecence," "concreteness," and "abstractness"), and because, as Whitehead rightly says, "there are two senses of the one," also the divine (= "the one which is all") and the nondivine (= "the one among the many").

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