

One can hardly fail to be struck by Hartshorne's very different claims in arguing for psychicalism.

In some places, he can claim, reasonably enough, "Only what acts as one feels as one" ("Can We Understand God?" 76). Here acting as one is represented as being the *necessary* condition of feeling as one: if x feels as one, then x acts as one.

Elsewhere, however, Hartshorne makes the very different, and far more questionable, claim, "what acts as one feels as one" ("In Defense of Wordsworth's View of Nature": 85). Here acting as one is represented as the *sufficient* condition of feeling as one: if x acts as one, then x feels as one.

Whereas the first claim reasonably explains why nonsingulars need not be understood to feel, the second claim begs the question of whether any singular needs to be understood to feel.

One cannot argue for a philosophical position by simply appealing to a "principle" that asserts the truth of the same position! ^{in question}

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