

1. Significantly, Hartshorne himself allows not only that relativity, or relatedness, like "absoluteness or neutrality to relational alternatives," permits degrees as well as an eminent case, but also that "relatedness admits intensive, and not just numerical or extensive, gradations" (DR: 122). He immediately goes on to say, to be sure, "Thus the relation of knowing has gradations of clearness as well as of scope." But whatever connection Hartshorne's psychicalism may lead him to assert between relatedness and knowledge, or knowing, he explicitly acknowledges at least in this passage that "relatedness" is one thing, "knowing," something else.

2. If one asks how the gradations of intensive relatedness can be specified, I see no reason why one cannot keep the distinction between "some" and "all" by which the degrees and the eminent case of extensive relatedness are specified. In other words, just as in the ordinary noneminent case of relatedness, extensive relatedness is to some but not to all things, so intensive relatedness is to some of some things but not to all even of them. By the same token, just as the eminent case of extensive relatedness consists in relatedness not merely to some but to all things, so the eminent case of intensive relatedness consists in relatedness to all of all things, not merely to some of all of them.

3. Clearly, if relatedness can and must be distinguished from knowing, it also can and must be distinguished from awareness. In that event, it is false to say, as Hartshorne does (DR:141) that "only an adequate awareness can fully measure and contain the being and value of everything." An adequate, or eminent, relatedness can also fully measure and contain the being and value of everything.

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Hartshorne argues that "only an ideally perfect memory could constitute such conservation [sc. of experience, in its full vividness and value]" ("The

*Buddhist-Whiteheadian View of the Self and the Religious Traditions*" [#207]:  
301).

But if "memory" here means "conscious awareness," as beyond any serious question it does, "an ideally perfect memory" can be, at most, a symbolic, not an analogical, much less a literal, way of speaking. For memory, in this sense, is not a "cosmic," but a "local," variable; and only "cosmic variables" can be either analogical or literal.

What Hartshorne should argue, then, is that only an ideally all-inclusive concrete reality could constitute the conservation of experience in its full vividness and value; and that this reality may be conceived and symbolized symbolically as "an ideally perfect memory," or "an imperishable and wholly clear and distinct retrospective awareness, which we may call the memory of God" (*ibid.*).

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