

1. Significantly, Hartshorne can evidently refer to his "six theistic proofs" simply as "some six reasons" he has for belief in God (Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes: 34). In point of fact, he seems to me to have been clear right along that, when you look at the matter carefully, this is all any so-called proof in philosophy, including the theistic proofs, could possibly be.

2. Even so, he also says, "I regret having called such arguments 'proofs,' as though each simply settled the question for all intelligent, honest, and trained minds. Little in philosophy can be proved in that sense" ("Postscript" to Santiago Sia, God in Process Thought: 121).

3. The question of the proofs is really the question whether, or to what extent, good and sufficient reasons can be given for belief in God. One could be said to succeed in giving some such reasons if, or insofar as, one could so connect theistic belief as a conclusion with certain other assertions as premises that denial of these assertions would appear to be too high a price to pay for denying the conclusion validly deduced from them. Ideally, one would seek to show that the price of denying theistic belief is, in fact, to fall into the absurdity of denying what cannot be reasonably denied. In this sense, the theistic proofs, or the giving of reasons for theistic beliefs, move in the direction of reductio ad absurdum arguments.