

Significantly, Hartshorne's discussion of "analogy" in his early article on the topic in An Encyclopedia of Religion takes the word in a very broad sense, other than that given the term when he later uses it in distinction from "symbol," on the one hand, "literal terms," on the other. As he takes the word in this article, it means simply "a similitude in relationship," and "similitude" is evidently taken to mean nothing other than the other terms used synonymously with it--namely, "similarity," "resemblance."

Thus he can say that "the three key analogies are perhaps the social analogy (prominent in the idea of the divine fatherhood), that God is to us as a superior and benevolent human being is to other human beings; the mind-body analogy, that God is the soul of the universe as a man is the soul of so much of nature as is included within his skin; and the artist analogy, that God creatively produces and shapes the universe" (20). But, clearly, all three of these so-called analogies are, in fact, symbols, given Hartshorne's ^{later} stricter use of the terms; for the resemblance between God and the mind, just like those between God and a ruler or God and an artist, are resemblances between God and one concrete species of things in contrast to others--whether bodies, subjects, or art objects.

No less significant, however, is Hartshorne's insistence in this article--in effect, if not in so many words (that, too, being significant)--that any analogy implies a literal or univocal claim but for which the analogy does not and cannot hold. Thus he says that "some abstract feature or ratio in common is implied, and this common feature must not be denied if anything is to be left of the analogy" (19).

There are also significant discrepancies between Hartshorne's discussion of analogy in DR and the discussion in LP and CSPM. Thus, e.g., in DR, he uses the terms "univocal," "analogical," and "metaphorical" in

something like the way in which he uses "literal," "analogical," and "symbolic" in LP and CSPM. In both cases, also, he takes the position that analogical terms apply to God "literally," to nondivine things, nonliterally, whether symbolically or metaphorically. But whereas in LP and CSPM, he insists that certain things can and must be predicated of God "literally," in DR he does not allow that any terms can be predicated of God "univocally." On the contrary, he argues that because of the metaphysical uniqueness of God, all concepts when applied to God are "analogical" in comparison with their other applications. Thus, e.g., even "absolute" and "relative," which are said to apply to God "literally" in the later writings, are said to be "analogical" in DR (31 f.).