

I find it interesting that Luther already makes something very like my distinction between the being (or structure) of God in itself and the meaning of God for us.

Thus, according to a passage cited by Watson in *Let God Be God* (p. 32, n. 69), Luther says: "Men describe God, speculatively, by certain similtudes;— that God is the centre which is everywhere, and the sphere which is nowhere. But all that is mathematical and physical, which we leave to other professors. We are seeking the theological definition: that is, not a definition of the divine essence, which is incomprehensible, but of his will and affection,— what pleases him and what does not please him."

I take it that the same distinction also underlies Luther's well-known statement about "the proper subject of theology," which is "man as guilty on account of sin, and lost, and God the justifier and savior of man as a sinner" (also quoted by Watson, p. 23). Of course, this is a specifically Christian specification of the distinction. But, clearly, the question of "man as guilty on account of sin, and lost" can only be the existential question, just as "God the justifier and savior of man as a sinner" can only be an answer—and, for Christian faith, *the* answer—to that question.

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