

Marxsen rightly distinguishes between "*eine Glaubensaussage im eigentlichen Sinne*," on the one hand, and "*eine weltanschauliche Überzeugung*," on the other. But the question, of course, is how exactly the referents of these two phrases, different as they are, are related. The apparent fact that a proper assertion of faith can be expressed (only?) in terms of *some* conviction as to world view certainly suggests that the relation is somehow close. Yet how, exactly, is it to be understood?

My guess is that it is to be understood somewhat as follows:

(1) any proper assertion of faith, although not itself a conviction as to world view, necessarily implies some such conviction as well as the proper metaphysical assertion(s) that it in turn necessarily implies;

(2) any proper assertion of faith itself and as such—as distinct from its implications—is "existential" (i.e., *existentiell*), in that it expresses an understanding of my own unique existence here and now, not an existentialist (i.e., *existential*) understanding of human existence in general, whether that of a world view, properly so-called, or that of a proper metaphysics; and

(3) where the faith expressed by a proper assertion of faith is actualized, and is a "living," not a "dead," faith, hope as well as love is also actualized, together with expressions of hope as well as expressions of love (cf. Marxsen's later statement: "where faith is without hope, there is a lack of faith," which parallels exactly Paul's thought about love's being that through which faith works).

The passages cited are from *Die Auferstehung Jesu von Nazareth*: 178, 181.