

Further confirmation that Whitehead often, if not always, uses "speculation" and its cognates in the sense of "construction" and its cognates—such as, for example, "constructive thought"—is provided by his discussion of the distinction between "speculation" and "scholarship" in *Adventures of Ideas*: 137 ff.:

For progress, both [*sc.* speculation and scholarship] are necessary. But, in fact, on the stage of history they are apt to appear as antagonists. Speculation, by entertaining alternative theories, is superficially sceptical, disturbing established modes of prejudice. But it obtains its urge from a deep ultimate faith, that through and through the nature of things is penetrable by reason. Scholarship, by its attention to accepted methodologies, is superficially conservative of belief. But its tone of mind leans towards a fundamental negation. For scholars the reasonable topics in the world are penned in isolated regions, *this* subject-matter or *that* subject-matter. Your thoroughgoing scholar resents the airy speculation which connects his own patch of knowledge with that of his neighbour. He finds his fundamental concepts interpreted, twisted, modified. He has ceased to be king in his own castle, by reason of speculations of uncomfortable generality, violating the very grammar of his thoughts. . . .

New directions of thought arise from flashes of intuition bringing new material within the scope of scholarly learning. They commence as the sheer ventures of rash speculation. They may fortunately obtain quick acceptance, or they may initiate a quarrel of scholars from which all tinge of speculation has faded. . . .

Pure speculation, undisciplined by the scholarship of detailed fact or the scholarship of exact logic, is on the whole more useless than pure scholarship, unrelieved by speculation. The proper balance of the two factors in progressive learning depends on the character of the epoch in question and on the capacities of particular individuals.

Yet further confirmation to the same effect is what Whitehead has to say about "speculation(s)" and "creeds" in *AI*: 66:

The ancient world of paganism was tolerant as to creeds. Provided that your actions conformed, your speculations were unnoticed. . . . Creeds are at once the outcome of speculation and efforts to curb speculation. . . . Antecedently to speculation there can be no creeds. Wherever there is a creed, there is a heretic round the corner or in his grave.

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(over)

Ad October 2000—I've increasingly come to wonder, however, whether Whitehead's distinction between "speculation" and "scholarship" may not more nearly correspond to my distinction between more and less critical modes of critical reflection. That is, "scholarship" refers to reflection that is less critical, because the criteria of critical judgment are consuetudinary criteria only, whereas "speculation" refers to reflection that is more critical, because its criteria are the ultimate criteria of common human experience and reason.

This means, for all practical purposes, of course, that the criteria of more critical reflection are the criteria provided by "the 'right' philosophy," which can be arrived at, not by "scholarship," but only by "speculation," in the sense of constructive explication of what common human experience and reason disclose.

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