

Whitehead says, "Everything has some value for itself, for others, and for the whole," and he even defines "the dim meaning of fact—or actuality—[as] intrinsic importance for itself, for the others, and for the whole" (MT: 151, 159). But just what can be meant by an actual occasion's having some value or intrinsic importance *for* itself is anything but clear.

In any case, what Whitehead's own most fundamental principles require as the defining characteristic of actuality, as distinct from reality more generally, is not that it have value *for* itself—whatever that might mean—but that it have value *in* itself, and so, as I should say, that it have *intrinsic* value. This any actuality has because, while, like anything real at all, it is, or is destined to be, of value for others, it is the kind of reality for which other things can have value. It is valuable *in itself*, because it is something *for which* anything can in principle have value—matter, make a difference, and so on.

8 August 2001