

There are different terms in which Whitehead characterizes what he calls "the first division of bodily feelings," or "the more primitive bodily experience which constitute[s] the division of experience first considered" (MTr: 72 f.).

Thus he can say, "At the base of our existence is the sense of 'worth,'" i.e., "the sense of existence for its own sake, of existence which is its own justification, of existence with its own character" (MTr: 109). Or he can speak of "the sense of existence as a value experience," and thus say that "our experience is a value experience," which "differentiates itself in the sense of many existences with value experience," this "sense of the multiplicity of value experiences again differentiat[ing] itself into the totality of value experience, and the many other value experiences, and the egoistic value experience" (MTr: 110). Or, again, he can speak simply of "the vague grasp of reality, dissecting it into a three-fold scheme, namely, The Whole, That Other, and This-Myself" (MTr: 110).

In somewhat the same way, he speaks of "the sense of importance" (MTr: 117 f.) and can say that "[o]ur experience starts with a sense of power, and proceeds to the discrimination of individualities and their qualities" (MTr: 119).

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