

Questions:

1. If it's true that "no two contemporary occasions are derived from a past wholly in common" (*AI*: 259 f.), how can it also be true that "human experience is an act of self-origination including the whole [*sic!*] of nature" (290)?

2. That occasions performing some common function in some percipient experience may thereby acquire the unity of a group *for that percipient* seems clear enough. But, surely, whether or not occasions constitute a nexus is independent of their performing some common function in some percipient experience. If any set of occasions in any way exhibits the basic property of "mutual immanence," it is a group—and, in particular, is the kind of group termed "nexus." And so, too, with other kinds of groups—societies, personally ordered ~~coscieties~~^{Societies}, and so on. So how can Whitehead say what he says in the opening sentence of Ch. XIII: The Grouping of Occasions?

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