

Whitehead's notion that the philosopher is "the critic of abstractions" in effect implies my distinction between the primary level of self-understanding and life-praxis, with the claims to validity that it makes or implies, and the secondary level of critical reflection.

This becomes particularly clear from Hartshorne's discussion of Whitehead's notion in *CSPM*: 57. The philosopher starts, Hartshorne argues, "not with the purely concrete, for which abstractions are to be found, but with such more or less suitable abstractions as are already available, and seeks to improve them, having in mind experiences of the concrete." This fits in exactly with my analysis of Whitehead's understanding of the nature and method of philosophy in *OT*: 73-78. As does Hartshorne's further notion that "philosophy differs from science by the scope of the abstractions with which it deals" (*CSPM*: 57).

16 September 1991