

When Whitehead says that "the great difficulty of philosophy is the failure of language," which failure derives from the fact that "the ordinary intercourse of mankind is concerned with shifting circumstance" (MT: 49), he seems to give support to my view that the destiny of metaphysics is to become transcendental and that categorial metaphysics is not, and cannot be, a final resting place. For, note what he says in the same context: "When the Greeks required terms for the ultimate characters of the actualities of nature, they had to use terms such as water, air, fire, and wood." But how different is it, really, to follow Whitehead himself in using terms such as "experience," "feeling," etc.?

Just as the destiny of existential thinking in its moral aspect is to become existentialist analysis so developed as to be inclusive of the analysis of ^{life} praxis ^{as well as of self-understanding,} so its destiny in its metaphysical aspect is to become transcendental metaphysics so developed as to be inclusive of metaphysics in the strict as well as in the broad sense of the word.

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