

To what extent does Whitehead imply, if not assert, that our immediate experience acquires its role as evidence only in the context of some language-game or other wherein it has "paradigmatic" status? (Otherwise put, is Whitehead simply one more philosopher in the line that reaches from Descartes to Husserl, who commits the fallacy of "methodological solipism," or is he, in his own way, well aware of the meaning-constitutive role of language?)

1. There certainly seems to be an important difference between Whitehead's analysis of the three fundamental notions underlying all our experience—namely, self, others, and the whole—and, e.g., Apel's analysis in terms of self, other selves, and the external world. To this extent, Whitehead might seem to be, in his own way, a methodological solipsist.

2. But there is certainly considerable evidence on the other side. For one thing, there is the fundamental claim that "speech is human nature itself" (*MT*: 51 f.). But this claim is further supported when, in response to the question as to where the evidence to which philosophy appeals is to be found, Whitehead answers, not simply "human experience," but rather "human experience as shared by civilized intercommunication," and then observes, "Philosophy is a secondary activity. It meditates on this variety of [*sc.* linguistic?] expression" (96 f.; cf. *AI*: 291 f.).

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