

On God as an Actuality

How much can be made of the fact that Whitehead can refer to what, on his view, can only be, in fact, *many* actualities as though they were *one* actuality?

That he can do this is clear when he says, for example, "There is an inflow and outflow of factors between the bodily actuality [*sic*] and the human experience [*sic*], so that each shares in the existence of the other" (*MT*: 157)—having said earlier in the same book, "Thus the one animal, and the various parts of its body, considered as themselves centres of experience, are in one sense on a level. Namely, they are centres of experience expressing themselves vividly to each other, and obtaining their own feelings mainly by reason of such mutual expressions" (33).

Can one fairly infer that something similar may be behind the statement: "The notion of a supreme being must apply to an actuality [*sic*] in process of composition," etc. (128)?

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