

"The concrete more" in concrete things from which the formulæ of mathematical physics abstract is some form or other of the same principle of which human experience is the only form clearly given in our experience. The question, however, remains, and must remain, open whether, or to what extent, any of the other forms of the principle, to say nothing of the principle itself, can and should be described by the word "experience." Psychicalism, properly so-called, simply begs this question.

The only proper way to conceive "the concrete more" of beings other than ourselves—so far, at least, as metaphysics is concerned—is as exemplifying or instantiating the same purely formal structure of concreteness as such that is the necessary condition of the possibility of our own being as experiencing, indeed, knowing, willing, loving beings. Our being as such, as existing understandingly, and so emphatically, or to the second power, is given simply as a special case, example, or instance, however privileged, of this formal structure. Moreover, anything else that we could conceive as concrete could only be yet another special case, example, or instance of this structure. In this sense, we may agree with psychicalism that "the concrete more that the mathematics leaves out" is "neither mere matter, whatever that could be, nor our human experiences, but a vast variety of forms taken by a principle of which *human* experience is only one extremely special form" (Hartshorne).

But if we are to avoid begging the question, as distinct from answering it, we dare not go on to say with the psychicalist, "This principle is experience as such or in general, experience whether human, subhuman, even subanimal, and perhaps also superhuman." On the contrary, all we can do is alter the original sentence to read after "*human* experience," "and, for all we know or possibly can know, any other form of experience, is but a special case."

I take it that this position is, in all essentials, the position Hartshorne criticizes as the "nonpsychicalist" position held by Bertrand Russell as well as

Wilfrid Sellers (and before him his father, Roy Wood Sellers and his colleague, DeWitt Parker). Cf. *CIAP*: 240-244.

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According to Wilfrid Sellars, “merely structural knowledge is incomplete. it lacks qualitative content. And ‘being must have content.’ Roy Wood Sellars’s colleague DeWitt Parker may have influenced him in this. Parker used to argue that structural notions, shapes for instance, by themselves are abstract and indeterminate. . . . The concepts of physics are determinables, not determinates. They could not be complete descriptions of anything. All three of these philosophers agree with Whitehead that there cannot be (qualitatively) ‘vacuous’ actuality. Russell was of the same opinion. But whereas Parker and Whitehead are psychicalists, Russell, RWS and WS are not. What then is the issue between these two groups?” (*IO*: 240).

“The nonpsychicalist assumes that the structure-quality contrast, when fully generalized, permits ‘quality’ to have a universal meaning and that what Peirce called ‘feeling-quality’ is a special case of a more general meaning; whereas psychicalists, and this includes Peirce, hold that the distinction between feeling-quality and quality not that of feeling is merely verbal. Quality as contrasted to structure is knowable only by feeling, and when thus known, the species of quality and the species of feeling are one. The nonpsychicalist is making a distinction without a difference. Or, he has failed to generalize ‘feeling’ to its limit while claiming to generalize quality still more widely” (241).

“The psychicalist identifies the mystery of quality with the mystery of feeling, whereas the nonpsychicalist has an additional mystery, that of qualities not those of feeling, human or nonhuman. I for one find the second mystery unintelligible. . . .

“Psychicalism has advantages that few of its rejectors have seemed to be conscious of. It can find, in the concept of prehension as feeling-of-feeling, clues to causality, spatial and temporal relations, God’s relations to creatures, creatures’ relations to God, that is, all the central problems of ontology. Of course, it is not easy to think of the feelings of an atom. Is it easier to think of the unfeeling content or quality of the atom? Are these really two mysteries, or is it only one? How other creatures feel is mystery enough for some of us” (242).

“If materialism means the doctrine that the whole truth about reality can be stated using only the structural concepts of physical science, then, as WS has said in his essay and elsewhere, materialism is false. But even if quality is admitted as a necessary and universally applicable concept, materialism explains nothing that psychicalism cannot explain at least as well. The explanatory power of the concept of mere insentient matter is exactly zero. There are *insentient wholes in nature*—rocks and trees, for examples—but the assertion that these wholes are insentient also in their parts explains nothing whatever. It is not even needed to explain why many philosophers make the assertion. For that fact quite other reasons or causes are at hand” (243).