

“Transcendental metaphysics” is a happy designation for what I have in mind not just for one reason, but for two.

Not only does metaphysics properly so-called concern itself exclusively with what the medievals termed “transcendentals,” as distinct from “categories,” but it also proceeds by the method that Kant termed “transcendental deduction,” or, as I also call it, using Nygren’s term, “presuppositional analysis.”

Categorial metaphysics, by contrast, proceeds by the “speculative” method of “generalization,” which is supposed to yield—beyond analysis of the necessary conditions of the possibility of experience—an analogical concept of “experience as such” applicable in some (more or less different) sense to any ultimate subject of predication across the infinite range from the least to the greatest conceivable.

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