

The distinction between concrete(s), on the one hand, and concrecence, on the other, probably needs to play more of a role in my outline of transcendental metaphysics than I have hitherto realized.

Perhaps the underlying distinction here is that between a morphological analysis, on the one hand, and a genetic analysis, on the other. Whereas the first concerns itself with the structure involved in the form of reality, the second concerns itself with the structure involved in the genesis of reality. Otherwise put, a morphological analysis of concretes (as well as abstracts) is concerned with the products of process (and the factors necessary to their production)—in short, "facts"; while a genetic analysis of concrecence is concerned with the process producing the products—in short, "principle(s)."

Whitehead, as I recall, makes some such distinction in the brief outline of metaphysics in RM. I need to compare it to see what I can learn from it.

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