

I can only wonder whether there isn't a close connection somehow between (1) my explanation of how a transcendental property can be the property of an ordinary, nontranscendental property; and (2) Hartshorne's explanation of how, notwithstanding the interdependence or symmetry of ultimate contrasts, there is an underlying one-way dependence or asymmetry between them.

On my explanation, a transcendental property can be the property of an ordinary property by being a property of the event or individual qualified by the ordinary property. On Hartshorne's explanation, there is an underlying one-way dependence or asymmetry between the poles of ultimate contrasts, because, although the two poles of a contrast are interdependent or symmetrical *as concepts*, this is not the case with their respective referents, as between which there is one-way dependence or asymmetry. Thus, for example, "concrete(ness)" and "abstract(ness)," taken as concepts, are interdependent and symmetrical, the meaning of either depending on that of the other. But considered with respect to their respective referents, theirs is a relationship of one-way dependence or asymmetry, in that the concrete referred to by the first includes the abstract referred to by the second, not the other way around.

I wish I could be clearer than I am about just why these two explanations seem to be somehow closely connected. But, as it is, the only reason that occurs to me is that, although transcendental properties and ordinary properties are both properties and, as such, abstracts, the first are more abstract than the second, even as the second are less abstract, or more concrete, than the first. Whether or not this is a relevant reason, however—and, in point of fact, whether or not there is even anything requiring to be explained!—continues to elude me.

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