

1. According to the reasoning in my notes, "Critical Theory and Revisionary Metaphysics," the *passiones entis convertibiles* are all constituted by the unavoidable, indispensable human interests—in the true, the good (including the just or right), and the beautiful.

2. Necessarily presupposed by these interests, however, is *the* interest in reality as such, as that which makes a difference, and in the oneness of reality, its whatness, its somewhatness, and so on. But this interest constitutes *the passio entis convertibile*. The human subject is interested in and has to take account of the real; and the real includes whatever it, in one way or another, is interested in or has to take account of. (In the first instance, the human subject's interest in the real is *existential*, wherefor it takes account of the real in its meaning for us, for our self-understanding and/or life-praxis. But the human subject also has an *intellectual* interest in the real, wherefor it also takes account of the real in its structure in itself.)

3. By "the *ultimately* real," then, one properly means whatever the human subject has to take account of, or have some interest in, no matter what else it may or may not have to take account of, or have an interest in. And by "the *strictly ultimately* real," one properly means whatever any subject that is so much as conceivable would somehow have to take account of, no matter what else it did or did not take account of—if only in the completely general sense of being really, internally related to it and therefore dependent on it and affected by it.

4. The *passiones entis disjunctæ*, by contrast, are constituted wholly objectively, by the modal and, therefore, temporal distinctions between necessary and contingent, actual, possible, and necessary, etc., as well as by the distinctions between logical-ontological types, i.e., concrete and abstract, divine and nondivine; event, individual, and aggregate; individualities, species, genera, and categories, on the one hand, and transcendentals, on the other.