

1. A concrete is relative in that it involves real, internal relations not only with abstracts, or with some intensional class of concretes that it requires merely generically or indefinitely, but also with other concretes that it requires specifically or definitely.

2. An abstract, by contrast, is relative, if it is, in that it involves real, internal relations, not with any specific or definite concretes, but only with some intensional class thereof that it requires merely generically or indefinitely (cf. *CSPM*: 264).

3. Beyond the transcendental distinction between a concrete and an abstract, there is the further type distinction between ordinary abstracts, i.e., individualities, species, genera, categories, and extraordinary abstracts, i.e., transcendentals.

4. Although an abstract of either type is relative, if it is, in that it involves real, internal relations, not with any specific or definite concretes, but only with some intensional class thereof that it requires merely generically or indefinitely, there is the important difference that the intensional class of concretes that any ordinary abstract requires is only contingently nonempty, whereas the intensional class of concretes that an extraordinary abstract requires is nonempty necessarily.—One may also say that, although the intensional class of concretes that an extraordinary abstract requires is not determined by anything more specific or definite than “concreteness,” the intensional class of concretes required by any ordinary abstract is determined, to some extent, more specifically or definitely.

5. Whether an abstract is relative depends on how we use terms.—If “relative,” even in the broadest sense, means “constituted in some way or degree by relation to the contingent” (Hartshorne), then any ordinary abstract is relative, because it is constituted by relation to an intensional class of concretes that is nonempty only contingently, or is determined by something more specific or definite than “concreteness.” On the other hand, an extraordinary abstract is not

relative in the same sense of the term, because the intensional class of concretes that it requires generically or indefinitely is nonempty necessarily, or is determined solely and simply by “concreteness.”

6. Whereas abstracts are causes but not effects, in that they are really, internally related to concretes in only one of the two ways in which this is possible, concretes are effects as well as causes, in that they are really, internally related to concretes in both of these ways. Causes require their effects merely generically or indefinitely, effects require their causes specifically or definitely.

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