

1. According to my outline of transcendental metaphysics, there are two differences in ontological type that are fundamental to all others: that between subjects or concretes, on the one hand, and properties or abstracts, on the other; and that between the universal individual and extraordinary events, on the one hand, and particular individuals and ordinary events, on the other.

2. Significantly, both of these differences exhibit the same structure of symmetry within a more fundamental asymmetry. Thus, while subjects or concretes, on the one hand, and properties or abstracts, on the other, mutually require one another, neither being exemplified or instantiated without the other, and insofar exhibit symmetry, subjects or concretes require properties or abstracts by a necessity that is specific or definite, while properties or abstracts require subjects or concretes by a necessity that is merely generic or indefinite, and to this extent exhibit asymmetry. In much the same way, the universal individual and extraordinary events, on the one hand, and particular individuals and ordinary events, on the other, mutually require one another, neither being exemplified or instantiated without the other, and insofar exhibit symmetry, particular individuals and ordinary events require the universal individual and extraordinary events by a necessity that is specific or definite, while the universal individual and extraordinary events require particular individuals and ordinary events by a necessity that is merely generic or indefinite, and to this extent exhibit asymmetry.

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