

One of the problems with my outline of transcendental metaphysics is that the distinction between "individuals" and "existents" is not an ontological-type distinction, and "existent" is not a strictly metaphysical, at least not a transcendental, concept.

Of course, one could argue that, in a broad sense of "metaphysics," the distinction in question is a distinction in ontological type and "existent" is a metaphysical, even if not a transcendental, concept. But perhaps it would be better to say that "existent," although not a transcendental concept, is an existential concept—indeed, is *the* "existential," insofar as "existentials" are necessary conditions of the possibility of existents in the emphatic sense of the word "existence," i.e., self-understanding individuals.

Thus, whereas metaphysics in a strict sense involves nothing but transcendentals, metaphysics in a broad sense involves existentials as well as transcendentals.

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