

Could the solution to my problem concerning “individualities” as yet a further type of ordinary, ontic abstracts—completing the series beginning with “categories,” and including “genera” and “species”—lie in recognizing that the individual or individuating property of the universal individual, as distinct from any and all particular individuals, is itself transcendental, or a transcendental?

In other words, already included in the type of extraordinary, ontological abstracts is the individual or individuating property of the universal individual. So its unique individuality is already accounted for simply in mentioning the type “transcendentals.” On the other hand, “individualities” as a distinct term ending the series “categories,” “genera,” “species,” refers solely to the lowest kind of ordinary, ontic abstracts.

Terminologically, I could use “essence,” in the sense of “individual (or individuating) properties,” as the *Oberbegriff*, reserving “individuality” for the sole more specific purpose of designating this lowest kind of ordinary, ontic abstracts.

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