

## *On Transcendental Metaphysics*

### 1. The Task

To work out just that utterly abstract, purely formal, literal (= transcendental) metaphysics (in the broad as well as in the strict sense of "metaphysics") that is both possible and necessary:

### 2. The Conceptuality/Terminology

Included in the conceptuality/terminology necessary to such a metaphysics are the following concepts/terms:

1. **a concrete singular** (= instance = subject); hence also either
2. **an event** (or an actual state of an individual); or
3. **an individual**; or
4. **an aggregate** (= composite) **of concrete singulars** (i.e., events and/or individuals);
5. **an abstract** (= property = object); hence also either
6. **an ordinary** (= particular = ontic) **abstract**, i.e., an individuality,<sup>1</sup> a species, a genus, or a category; or
7. **an extraordinary** (= universal = ontological) **abstract**; hence also either
8. **a transcendental**, convertible or disjunctive; or
9. **an existential**;<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>To speak, in a very general sense, of the "individuality" of an individual is to speak of its essence, its essential, as distinct from its accidental, properties. But as used here, "individuality" has a more restricted meaning, designating the essence, or the essential properties, of *an ordinary, transitory individual* only. Therefore, although it is entirely proper to speak, in a very general sense, of the "individuality" of the extraordinary, everlasting individual, also, it must be remembered that there is an infinite, qualitative difference between its essential properties and those of any ordinary, transitory individual. Whereas the latter are all on the lowest level of ordinary abstracts, the essential properties of the extraordinary, everlasting individual are all on the higher level of extraordinary abstracts, i.e., transcendentals, the concept of such an individual being, indeed, *the* transcendental in which all the others are unified.

<sup>2</sup> The term "an existential," as used here to designate a property on the lower level of extraordinary abstracts, is nominalized in the same way in which Martin

10. **an ordinary** (= particular = ontic), **transitory individual**;
11. **the extraordinary** (= universal = ontological), **everlasting individual**;
12. **an existent** in the emphatic sense of an ordinary, transitory individual that understands.

### 3. The Distinctions

Among the distinctions that a transcendental metaphysics would appear to require are those between:

1. **concretes** (= instances = subjects) and **abstracts** (= properties = objects);
2. **events** (or the actual states of individuals) and **individuals**;
3. **concrete singulars**, i.e., events or individuals, and **aggregates** (= composites) **of concrete singulars**;
4. **ordinary** (= particular = ontic) **abstracts**, i.e., individualities, species, genera, and categories, and **extraordinary** (= universal = ontological) **abstracts**, i.e., either **transcendentals**, convertible or disjunctive, or **existentials**;
5. **the extraordinary** (= universal = ontological), **everlasting individual** and **ordinary** (= particular = ontic), **transitory individuals**; and
6. **ordinary** (= particular = ontic), **transitory individuals** and **existents** in the emphatic sense of ordinary, transitory individuals that understand.

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Heidegger nominalizes "*eine Existenzial*" to refer to an essential property of "an existent," as understood in 2.12.