Heinrich Scholz, *Metaphysik als strenge Wissenschaft*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1965 (unchanged photographic impression of the Köln, 1941 edition)

I. General Comments

Of the many points made in this fascinating book, four seem the most memorable:

1. It seems possible in principle to develop a metaphysics which is, in effect, indistinguishable from *logic*, as (in the Kantian sense) a system of formal truths (152). Such a metaphysics may also be said to be an *ontology* in the sense of "a theory that includes the totality of truths that can be formulated . . . about things that can be meaningfully grasped as individuals, and thus are truths that are not restricted to any particular realms of individuals or worlds but are of unrestricted validity" (13 f.).

2. Such a metaphysics, however, is not the whole of philosophy, but, at most, its "transcendental-philosophical," as distinct from its "real-philosophical," dimension or aspect. The contrast between the two aspects lies in that, (1) whereas the truths established by the former apply to *every possible world*, the truths established by the latter apply to *this actual world*, to which we ourselves inescapably belong; and (2) the former has the certainty of a "strict science" (in a sense even stricter than mathematics, since mathematical judgments are "synthetic," rather than "analytic" [170]), whereas the judgments of "real-philosophy" are necessarily "synthetic" or "contingent" (176 f.) and also belong to "the realm of proclamation," not "the realm of research" (158), having something of the nature of a "confession" about them (161). (Here it may not be irrelevant to remark that Scholz's "synthetic" or "contingent" seems rather like Hartshorne's in that it covers everything that is not "analytic," "necessary," and "formal," including therefore both physical science and matters of faith [171], despite the obvious and important differences between them. Also, what Scholz allows as a "real-philosophical metaphysics of nature," or "an ontology of the actual world" [162 ff., 181] is perhaps more properly called "a cosmology," while what he calls a "real-philosophical metaphysics of the human spirit" [168 ff.] is perhaps not too different from what Bultmann, say, means by "a theology," or even what Heidegger means by "a fundamental ontology," i.e. a [philosophical or metaphysical] anthropology.)

3. Essential to any "ontology of the actual world" is a theory of identity that can be applied to individuals that are bound to time, i.e., a theory of "genidentity" (181), according to which we can say that an individual is identical with itself at two different moments of time. (Scholz apparently thinks that there are or could be individuals that are not thus "genidentical." But the interesting question, surely, is whether such an individual could be anything other than an occasion of experience or an "actual entity" in Whitehead's sense of the words. I.e., could the general category of individuals having strict identity warrant the classical conception of God as neither a genidentical individual nor *an* actual entity?)

4. There is no possibility that a statement attributing our knowledge of the *veritates aeternae* to the illumination of the soul by God can itself, as a "statement of faith," ever appear as one of the statements of metaphysics in the strict sense (171). Hartshorne is doubtless correct that Scholz does not seem to see how necessarily existent individual could very well be one of the individuals existing *in every possible world*, and therefore such as to be properly affirmed even by a strict metaphysics. Still, the question remains whether necessarily existing individual is simply the same as God, or whether (as Hartshorne himself seems to admit in allowing that talk about God is, in essential respects, "analogical") Scholz is partly correct after all in holding that assertions about God as such are not metaphysical in the strict sense but assertions of personal faith.

II. Selections, Paraphrases, and Special Comments

13 f.—"The metaphysics we will defend will have nothing to say either about the world-whole or the human soul or the existence of a highest being. Thus it will be neither a cosmology in this Kantian sense nor a psychology nor a theology. But? But a kind of ontology, although not an ontology in the sense of a theory of being as such. Rather, it will be as distant therefrom as from a Kantian cosmology, psychology, or theology. It will be an ontology in the sense of a theory that comprises the totality of truths, which can be formulated in the language we will agree on, about things that can be meaningfully conceived as individuals, so that these truths are not restricted to any realms of individuals or worlds but are of unrestricted validity. They are valid in every non-empty realm of individuals and, in this well-defined sense, in every possible world." (A realm of individuals is said to be empty if, and only if, there is no thing that belongs to it.)—My questions about this are mainly two: (1) Is the reason Scholz's proposed metaphysics will not provide either a cosmology, psychology, or theology in the Kantian sense that these all have to do, perhaps in different ways, with "the actual world," whereas the metaphysics he's arguing for has to do with "the totality of possible worlds"? (2) Is the reason Scholz's proposed metaphysics is not an ontology in the sense of a theory of being as such that "being as such" would include more than individuals, whereas Scholz's metaphysics is a theory precisely and only about individuals? (The alternative reason, so far as I can tell, is that it is not an ontology in the traditional sense because the latter is [tacitly] understood as "an ontology of the actual world" [cf. 181], and thus for the same reason that it is neither a cosmology, psychology, nor theology, either.)

15—Is what Scholz speaks of earlier (13) as "a theory that comprises the totality of truths . . . about things that can be meaningfully conceived as individuals" the same as what he here calls "a theory of identity and difference"? Or is the second merely the "sample" of the first that he limits himself to providing in this book? The second interpretation seems to me better to catch his meaning.

155—I take it that by "identity-theoretical metaphysics" here Scholz intends to refer to the "sample" provided in this book of what he distinguishes from it as "the new metaphysics in general." Cf. 15 above.

155 f.—Scholz speaks of Leibniz's confrontation of "the actual world" with "the totality of possible worlds" as providing two principles for producing or generating philosophizing. Presupposing that philosophizing is in any case a discussion of the human spirit with powers different from itself and standing over against itself, one may distinguish two chief forms of philosophizing, viz., philosophizing that unfolds as a discusssion of the human spirit with the totality of possible worlds; and philosophizing that is carried out as a discussion of the human spirit with the actual world. The first may be called "transcendental-philosophical," albeit not in the Kantian sense but in a significant sense. Kant simply took over a traditional term still current in his age through which his reader would realize that transcendental-philosophical inquiry and research in Kant's sense would henceforth have the same foundational significance for all philosophizing that the transcendental-philosophical observations at the beginning of traditional, pre-Kantian metaphysics had for it. But, in Scholz's use, "transcendental-philosophical" once again acquires a significant sense, because philosophizing in this form is not restricted to "this" world, i.e., the "actual" world to which we all belong once and for all, but is such that the actual world shrinks into but one of the possible worlds and in this sense is indeed transcended. The second form of philosophizing may be called "real-philosophical," because it leaves possible worlds aside, so as to concentrate on the actual world. Interestingly, Scholz treats this second form together with the other Socratic form of philosophizing as a discussion of the human spirit, not with powers other than itself, but precisely with itself. Both forms have to do with the actual world. (This, incidentally, seems to make clear that the answer I suggested to the first of my two questions on 13 f. above is correct: Scholz's "new metaphysics" does not include either a cosmology, psychology, or theology in the Kantian sense because it is a form of "*transcendenta*l-philosophical" philosophizing, while they all forms of the other "*real*-philosophical" type.

157—Note Scholz's use of the phrase "the *universe* of possible worlds," presumably as synonymous with what he otherwise speaks of as "the *totality* of possible worlds" (italics added).

158 f.—The morphology that distinguishes between the two chief forms or types of philosophizing, viz., transcendental- and real-philosophical, contains a second morphology, i.e., one that distinguishes between a philosophy that today stands on the level of a strict science—in the case of transcendental-philosophical philosophizing—and one that is fundamentally different froma strict science—in the case of real-philosophical philosophizing. In fact, Scholz argues, the second can move completely out of "the realm of research" and go over into "the realm of proclamation," a magnificent sample of which is provided by the most beautiful and monumental parts of the Kantian ethic: "Thus art thou to be; thou may'st not flee from thyself !" No researcher in the world speaks in this way; so speaks an educator of the human race. Philosophizing in the Fichtean sense or in the way that has become so consequential through Nietzsche is more or less completely a matter of proclamation. But even where philosophical discussion with the actual world is utterly free of proclamation, it is far from being able to come up with results that can be agreed on as can the propositions of our theory of identity. No two

original thinkers completely agree with one another even about the most important opinions concerning doctrine.

160—A "strict science" is "a science in which results can be made precise with at least mathematical exactness and put in the form of axiomatic-deductive theories."

161—If none of the essential accomplishments of real-philosophical philosophizing is a mere creature of fantasy; and if anything that can interest a thinking person in a more or less lasting way has some value as knowledge that we are to respect as such, still there is something in every one of these accomplishments that is not present in the *mathesis universalis*. In all of them there is something like a confession. There is something in all of them of the character of a Leibnizian monad: they reflect the world in a way that is subjectively bound and not binding on everyone who can judge. Beyond this, there is a serious question as to essence: when is a discussion with the actual world to be called *"philosophical"*? No one has succeeded in proposing a criterion with which everyone can agree. But perhaps one may still indicate the direction in which this discussion is to be undertaken. One may say that it must be related in a certain intense way to "life-important" questions, and that a decision as to what deserves to be called "life-important" is, in general, a function of place and time.

162—In addition to the new metaphysics that has attained the level of a strict science, there are two worthwhile real-philosophical forms of metaphysics: a metaphysics of nature and a metaphysics of the human spirit.

164—What Scholz calls "Aristotle's objectifying way of speaking" calls to mind things as disparate as Bultmann's understanding of science (other than philosophy) and my understanding of the "mythical" remnant in "categorial metaphysics."

171—We owe our remarkable knowledge of analytic propositions to an illumination that is a *phenomenon sui generis*. But to speak of this as a divine spark is to offer an interpretation that expresses a personal faith, which no one can either leave to another or impose on another. And it is all the more evident that no such proposition of faith can appear as a proposition in a metaphysics comprising universally valid assertions.

177 f.—The universally valid assertions are indeed *necessary* conditions for any orientation in the actual world: *without* these assertions one cannot achieve any such orientation. But this is not in the least to say that they are also *sufficient* therefor, that one can find one's way around in the actual world with them alone. This means that, in relation to the actual world, the universally valid assertions have to be *supplemented* by the assertions restricted to it.

178-181—It is certain that in the actual world one cannot do simply with the kind of identity that our identity theory clarifies. According to Aristotles's proposition, if two individuals are identical, every property belonging to one of

them also belongs to the other, and vice versa. Our limited formalized language doesn't allow us to formulate this Aristotelian proposition, although it expresses precisely the sense in which our theory understands identity. But then no human individual at two different points in time can be identical with itself in this sense; for at least the length of its life at the later point is different from that at the earlier. And yet we've reckoned the assertion that every individual is identical with itself among the universally valid assertions of our theory. Have we then contradicted ourselves? No we haven't, because the assertion that every individual is identical with itself is unrestrictedly valid even for every human individual *provided it's viewed at a specific point in time.* Any human individual is indeed identical with itself at any point in time. Indeed, it is incontestable that any individual belonging to the actual world is such that, at point in time *t*, it is identical with itself at that point.

181—An urgent task of an ontology of the actual world is to clarify the kind of identity that we intend when we identify a human individual with itself at two different points in time. Significantly, the problem of such identity has not remained completely unknown to identity-metaphysicians. In fact, they even have their own name for this kind of identity: they call it "genidentity," and they have some things to say about it.

185—The *content* of a metaphysics of identity cannot be actual, and also cannot be historical. All that can be actual, and so also historical, is the *form* in which this content is presented at a specific point in time. Consequently, anything of this content that stands fast is in a unique sense an element in a *philosophia perennis.* No one should fail to show the respect that such a philosophy deserves who is not so unplatonic that he is indifferent to and closed against everything that cannot be registered on a barometer lastingly fixed on "changeable."