

Concerning the whole issue of "logic(al) in a broad sense," distinctions may be made between three levels:

- (1) syntactic;
- (2) semantic; and
- (3) pragmatic.

Given these distinctions, then, one may say, first, that the contradictories of true mathematical and logical assertions, in the usual narrow sense of "logic(al)," are self-contradictory even on the *syntactic* level;

second, that the contradictories of true strictly metaphysical assertions, or, if you will, logical assertions in the by no means usual broad sense of "logic(al)," are self-contradictory on the *semantic*, even if not on the syntactic, level; and

third, that the contradictories of true broadly metaphysical assertions are self-contradictory on the *pragmatic*, even if not on the semantic level.

Finally, one may say, in terms of Passmore's distinction,

first, that contradictories of assertions that are self-contradictory on either the syntactic or the semantic level are, in their different ways, "*absolutely* self-refuting"; and

second, that contradictories of assertions that are self-contradictory on the pragmatic level are "*pragmatically* self-refuting."

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