What is the principle of the distinction between necessity and contingency?

The principle of the distinction between necessity and contingency is the distinction between universal and particular. Every step from universal to particular involves contingency, whereas every step from particular to universal involves necessity. Thus, for example, from "There is an animal," it does not follow that "There is a fox." But from "There is a fox," it does follow that "There is an animal."

Of all that exists, what, if anything, might not have existed? Everything might not have existed except "something" and what "something" necessarily implies—namely, "divine something inclusive of nondivine somethings."

This does not mean, of course, that there might ever be or have been nothing more particular than merely divine something inclusive of nondivine somethings. It means only that, although particularization of mere somethingness—divine and nondivine—is not necessary, in that every step from the most universal idea of somethingness is contingent, it is not contingent but necessary that *some* particularization of somethingness—divine and nondivine— should take place. It is not accidental that accidents happen, nor is it accidental that somethingness is somehow particularized.

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