

A necessary condition of anything that is so much as possible is whatever it would somehow have to take account of, if only in the purely formal sense of being internally related to it, dependent upon it, influenced by it, and so on.

By contrast, a necessary condition of the possibility of any individual in the specific sense of "*understanding* individual," i.e., an "existent" in the emphatic sense of the word, is whatever it would somehow have to take account of not only in the purely formal sense, but also in the specifically material sense of understanding it and, in *that* way, being internally related to it, dependent upon it, influenced by it, and so on.

The same logic applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to talk about a necessary condition of the possibility of any individual in the sense of "*sentient* individual": it would have to take account of any necessary condition of *its* possibility, not only purely formally, but also specifically materially, by *feeling* it, and, in that way, be internally related to it, dependent upon it, influenced by it, and so on.

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I have said that "the only logical-ontological type distinction I make with respect to ordinary individuals is between (1) ordinary individuals as such and (2) ordinary individuals that are also *understanding*" (Notebooks, 21 July 2005). But true as this statement may be—depending on just what is, and is not, to be meant by a "logical-ontological type distinction"—it is clear from the above that I also distinguish "*sentient* individuals" specifically from "*understanding* individuals," as well as from ordinary individuals generally.

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